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SOME THEMES IN THE PROPOSED FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE
Paul F. Rothstein*
lthough the Federal Rules of Evidence are under consideration by Con-
gress,1 it is unlikely that many of their major themes will be reversed.
The present article examines some of these themes as they appear in the
Supreme Court-approved draft.2 The aim is merely to make more explicit
the effects of the Rules and suggest some questions for study.
I. THE BIAS TOWARD ADMISSIBILITY
Perhaps the predominant theme is a "bias" in favor of admissibility.
Rule 102 states the objective of the Rules to be "that the truth may be as-
certained and proceedings justly determined." This by itself may seem
equivocal. But Rule 401 draws the circle of relevancy very wide: evidence is
relevant if it has "any tendency" to make a material proposition "more" or
"less" probable, to any degree.3 All relevant evidence is admissible unless
otherwise provided by the Constitution, a statute, the Rules, or other rules
adopted by the Supreme Court.4 Rule 403 provides for exclusion on an ad
hoc balancing, but in order for there to be such exclusion, probative value
must be "substantially" outweighed by certain dangers, including "unfair"
prejudice.
Article V of the Rules does away with all but a few privileges. 5 Gone
are the spousal communications privilege, the general physician - patient
privilege, the 'journalist privilege,6  and privileges for accountants7  and
social workers.'
Article VI does much the same in the area of witness competency, abol-
ishing all incompetencies9 except those relating to witnesses without per-
*Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
'See H.R. 5463, Committee Print, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the House Judiciary Committee, 93d
Congress, 1st Session, June 28, 1973 and Oct. 10, 1973, reported out somewhat modified, Nov- 15, 1973. See Appendix
to this article for tabulation of the proposed changes, with citations.
2Order, Nov. 20, 1972, 56 F.R.D. 183 (1972).
3Thus rejecting purportedly stricter tests of relevancy. See, e.g. Standafer v. First Nat'l Bank of Minneapolis, 236
Minn. 123, 52 N.W. 2d 718 (1952); Engel v. United Traction Co., 203 N.Y. 321,96 N.E. 731 (1911).
4Rule 402.
'For proposed amendments to this, see Appendix hereto.
'A number of jurisdictions have such a privilege. See listing in Branzburg v. Hayes 408 U.S. 665 (1972). See also
Comment, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1536 (1971); Note, 32 PITT. L. REV. 406 (1971); Note, 80 YALE L. J. 317 (1970); BLAisi,
PRESS SUBPOENAS, AN EsPIRICAL AND LEGAL ANALYSIS (REPORTER'S COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, LEGAL
DEFENSE AND RESEARCH FUND, 1972); COMMiSSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM REPORTERS PRIVILEGE ACT
(First Working Draft, 1973).
7See, for examples of this privilege, 8 WIGMORE §2286 (McNaughton rev.).
'See, for an example of this privilege, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE LAW AND RULES 4508.
'Rule 601. For proposed changes in this, see Appendix hereto. For discussion of traditional incompetencies see
generally ROWLEY, THE COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES, 24 IOWA L. REV. 482 (1939); FRYER, NOTE ON DISQUALIFICATION
OF WITNESSES, SELECTED WRITINGS ON EVIDENCE AND TRIAL 345 (1957); LADD, WITNESSES, 10 RUTGERS L. REV. 523
(1956); DAVIDSON, TESTIMONIAL CAPACITY, 39 B. U. L. REX. 172 (1959); COMMENT, 15 WAYNE L. REV- 1236 (1969);
Note, 23 ALA. L. REV. 405 (1971); Note 36 Mo. L_ REV. 382 (1971; Note, 55 IOWA L. REV. 1286 (1970); Note, 30
MONT. L. REV. 27 (1969); Note, 40 Miss. L.J. 121 (1968); Note, 38 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 95 (1962); Note, 24 MICH.
L. REV. 507 (1926).
On Dead Man rules see: NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE LAW AND RULES 4519 ; Mo. CODE ART. 35 §3; D.C.
FEDERAL BAR JOURNAL Vol. 33:21
sonal knowledgel1  and to judges" and jurors. 12 Rule 607 allows impeach-
ment of one's own witness as freely as of other witnesses, contrary to the
traditional rule. 13  Rule 608,14 in common with Rule 405,15 allows a
"new" 16 form of character evidence, personal opinion. 17 Rule 611(b) adopts
the "wide open" view of cross examination, as opposed to the "restrictive
view.""I While the primary impact of this last matter is on when some-
thing may be introduced, not what may be introduced, nevertheless the rule
reflects a de-emphasis of goals other than truth-ascertainment, and can, on
occasion, result in the tribunal hearing information it would not otherwise
hear. 19
Rule 701 expands the admissibility of well founded lay opinion and con-
clusion, allowing such where "helpful" rather than under the traditional
Code §§14-302, 14-304; VA. CODE §8-86; VANDERBILT, MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 334-341
(1949); RAY, DEAD MAN'S STATUTES, 24 01110 ST. L. ,J. 89 (1963); SMITH & PHELPS, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ANNOTATION
TO THE PROPOSED FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, 32 FED. BAR J. 270, 320 (1973); CARPENTER, THE DEAD MAN'S
STATUTE IN PENNSYLVANIA, 32 TEMP. L. Q. 399 (1959); CHADBORNE, HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION OF THE CALIFORNIA
DEAD MAN'S STATUTE, 4 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 175 (1957); CRAMER, INDIANA DEAD MAN'S STATUTE, 3 IND. LEGAL F. 356(1970); ECKERT, THE DEAD MAN'S RULE SHOULD BE RETAINED, 35 PENN. B.A.Q. 192 (1964); LADD, THE DEAD MAN'S
STATUTE: SOME FURTHER OBSERVATIONS AND A LEGISLArIVE PROPOSAL, 26 IOWA L. REV. 207 (1941); LEE, THE DEAD
MAN'S STATUTE AND THE UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE, 11 MIAMI L. Q. 103 (1956).
On age, lack of discretion, see: BIGELOW, WITNESSES OF TENDER YEARS, 9 CRIM. L. Q. 298 (1967); GOODWINE,
RULES OF EVIDENCE IN CASES INVOLVING LACK OF DISCRETION, 12 CATH. LAWYER 23 (1966); STAFFORD, THE CHILD AS
A WITNESS, 37 WASH. L. REV. 303 (1962).
On psychological factors, see: District of Columbia v. Arms, 107 U.S. 519 (1883); WEIHOFEN, TESTIMONIAL COM-
PETENCE AND CREDIBILITY, 34 CEO. WASH. L. REV. 53 (1965); Note, PSYCHIATRIC CHALLENGE OF WITNESSES, 9 VAND.
L. REV. 860 (1956); REDMOUNT, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASES OF EVIDENCE PRACTICES: INTELLIGENCE, 42 MINN. L. REV.
551 (1958); SLOVENKO, WITNESSES, PSYCHIATRY, AND THE CREDIBILITY OF THE TESTIMONY, 19 U. F.A. L. REV. 1 (1966).
On drugs, see: BURNS & MARKS, TESTIMONIAL RELIABILITY OF DRUG ADDICTS, 35 N.Y. L. REV. 259 (1960).
On spousal incompetency, see: Note, 38 VA. L. REV. 359 (1952).
"Rule 602.
"'Rule 605.
2Rule 606. For proposed amendment, see Appendix to this article.
For cases citing the Federal Rules of Evidence on this matter, see: United States v. McMann, 435 F.2d 813 (2d Cir.
1970) (Rule 606(b)) (earlier position); Castleberry v. N.R.M. Corp., 470 F.2d 1113 (10th Cir. 1972) (Rule 606(b)).
13Traditionally such impeachment is confined to situations of surprise and affirmative damage or where the witness
is the adverse party.
14This rule deals with evidence offered on the issue of witness credibility.
"5This rule deals primarily with character evidence offered for substantive purposes.
16Traditionally character offered on the issue of credibility or for substantive purposes may be shown only by evi-
dence of reputation or, in some situations, by evidence of specific instances.
"I1t has been suggested that this opens the door even wider than traditionally to a brand of particularly unprobative
evidence in white collar crime prosecutions, where, because it represents his stock-in-trade, the defendant will always be
able to produce persons who have a high opinion of him or can testify to his good reputation. For proposed amendment,
see Appendix to this article.
Rule 609, relating to impeachment by prior convictions, also strongly evidences a bias toward admissibility and is
discussed infra at notes 96-97, and accompanying text.
'
t See, on these views of scope of cross examination. CARLSON, CROSS EXAMINATION OF THE ACCUSED, 52 CORN.
L. Q. 705 (1967); MCCORMICK, THE SCOPE AND ART OF CROSS EXAMINATION, 47 N.W.U. L. REV. 177 (1952); SMITH,
RULES RELATING TO TIlE EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES, 219 (1948); Note, THE SCOPE OF CROSS EXAMINATION, 30 KY. L.J.
317 (1942); Note, THE SCOPE OF CROSS EXAMINATION, 24 IOWA L. REV. 564 (1939); Comment, SCOPE OF CROSS EXAMI-
NATION IN LOUISIANA, 10 TULANE L. REV. 294 (1936). See also CAROL, THE EXTENT OF CROSS EXAMINATION TO WHICH AN
ACCUSED MAy BE SUBJECTED WHEN HE OFFERS HIMSELF AS A WITNESS IN His OWN BEHALF, 11 VA. L. REV. 249 (1936);
DEGNAN, NoN-RULES EVIDENCE LAW: CROSS-EXAMINATION, 6 UTAH L. REV. 323 (1959).
For cases citing the Federal Rules of Evidence (in various drafts) on the matter of scope of cross examination, see
United States v. Dillon, 436 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1971) (Rule 611(b)) (earlier restrictive version); United States v. Lewis,
447 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1971) (Rule 611(b)); United States v. Walker, 449 F.2d 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Rule 611(b));
United States v. Scarbrough, 470 F.2d 166 (9th Cir. 1972) (Rule 611 (b)).
For proposed amendment of Rule 611 (b) see Appendix hereto.
'This would be the case where, for example, for some reason the cross examiner cannot call the witness as his own
(e.g. because the prosecution cannot call the accused owing to the self-incrimination privilege) or will not so call him be-
cause of fear of being identified with him or fears of legal strictures relating to leading or impeaching one's own witness,
and the judge cannot be induced himself to call the witness.
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"collective facts" rule which in some jurisdictions required that there be no
other way to express the matter except by opinion or conclusion. 20 Rule 702
allows expert testimony not only where the matter is totally beyond lay
knowledge, as ostensibly required in some jurisdictions, 21 but also where the
testimony would "assist" the trier-of-fact. Rules 703 and 705 do away with
the stilted requirement of a hypothetical question, allowing expert testimony
based on a hypothetical set of facts presented to the expert before trial, as
well as on an at-trial hypothetical question, or on testimony heard, or on
personal observation. These rules dispense with the requirement that the
bases of expert opinions be given on direct; and they allow expert opinions
rationally 22 based on otherwise inadmissible evidence, contrary to the ostensi-
ble rule in some jurisdictions. 23 Rule 704 abolishes the ultimate opinion rule
that purportedly forbids otherwise admissible lay or expert opinion that is
couched in terms of an "ultimate issue." 24 Rule 706 encourages court-ap-
pointment of experts.
Article VIII greatly expands the reception of formerly inadmissible hear-
say: prior statements of witnesses for substantive purposes; 25 agent state-
ments in addition to those recognized under some tests; 26 statements of
present 27 or recent 28 sense impression; statements of medical history to
doctors; 29 statements to medical personnel who are not doctors; 30 state-
20See Whitney v. Central Paper Stock Co., 446 S.W.2d 415 (Mo. App. 1969).
2zSee, e.g. Manney v. Housing Authority of City of Richmond, 180 P.2d 69 (First Dist. Ct. of App., Cal. 1947). But
see Zelayeta v. Pac. Greyhound Lines, 232 P.2d 572 (same ct., 1951). See 7 WiGMORE §1923.
22Rationally means founded on a type of information "reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field."
23See, e.g., Sirico v. Cotto, 324 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1971).
24See, for restricted reading of the scope of the traditional "ultimate issues" rule, S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co.,
446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971) citing the Federal Rules of Evidence.
25But only if they are inconsistent with the present testimony, or consistent but offered to rebut express or implied
charges of improper influence, motive or recent fabrication; or if they are statements of identification on personal percep-
tion. See Rule 801(d)(1). This is proposed to be restricted. See Appendix to this article. For critical discussion of the tradi-
tional position, see Comment, 2 LOYOLA L. J. 238 (1971); Comment, 23 VAND. L. REV, 1365 (1970); Comment,
SUBSTANTIVE USE OF EXTRA JUDICIAL STATEMENTS OF WITNESSES UNDER THE PROPOSED FEDERAL RULES OF Evi-
DENCE, 4 U. RICH. L. REV. 110 (1969); Note, 82 HARV. L. REV. 475 (1968); See also Dow, K.L.M. v. TULLER, A NEW
APPROACH TO ADMISSIBILITY OF PRIOR STATEMENTS OF A WITNESS, 41 NEB. L. REV. 598 (1961); DAVIDSON, THE PRE-
VIOUS STATEMENTS OF A WITNESS, 32 AUST. L. J. 38 (1958); McCoRMIcK, THE TURNCOAT WITNESS: PREVIOUS STATE-
MENTS AS SUBSTANTIVE EVIDENCE, 25 TEXAS L. REV. 573 (1947); Note, 41 MARQ. L. REV. 317 (1957-58); Note, 30 CORN.
L. Q. 511 (1945).
For cases citing the various drafts of the Federal Rule of Evidence 801 as it relates to substantive use of prior state-
ments of witnesses, see: United States v. Cohen, 418 F.2d 68 (5th Cir. 1969) (Rule 8 01(c)(2 )(i)); United States v. Insana,
423 F.2d 1165 (2d Cir. 1970) (Rule 801(c)( 2)(iv)); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970) (Rule 801(c)(2)); United
States v. Briggs, 457 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1972) (Rule 801(d)(1)).
26Rule 801(d)(2)(D). Compare the restrictive test in Cole v. New York N.H.R.R. 174 Mass. 537, 55 N.E. 1044
(1900); Blackman v. West J.R.R., 52 A.370 (N.J. 1901); McNicholas v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 196 Mass. 138,
81 N.E. 889 (1907).
27Rule 803(1).
2
sRule 804(b)(2). For proposed amendment of this, see Appendix to this article.
For earlier attempts in this direction, see Mass. G. L. (Ter. Ed,) Ch. 233, Section 65, THE MASSACHIUSETrS HEARSAY
STATUTE OF 1898, Ch. 535, amended in 1941 and 1943; AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Rule
503 (1942); NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNtFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE, Rule
63(4)(c) (1953); NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT RULES OF EVIDENCE, Rule 63(32) (1965); CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE CODE,
§§1260, 1261 (1965); Goodale v. Murray, 227 Iowa 843, 289 N.W. 450, 126 A.L.R. 121 (1940); and see CHADBOURNE,
BENTHAM AND TIlE HEARSAY RULE-A BENTHAMITE VIEW OF RULE 63(4)(c) OF THE UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE, 75
HARV. L. REV. 932 (1962); LADD, THE HEARSAY WE ADMIT, 5 OKLa. L. REV. 271 (1952). See also Hew v. Aruda, 51
Hawaii 451, 462 P.2d 476 (1969) (citing the Federal Rules of Evidence); Woll v. Dugas, 104 N.J. Super. 586, 250 A.2d
775 (1969); Jastremsky v. General Motors Corp., 109 N.J. Super. 31, 262 A.2d 218 (1970).
Rule 803(4). Contra, Brewer v. Henson, 96 Ga. App. 501, 100 S.E.2d 661 (1957).
3°Rule 803(4). Cf. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE, §292 (2d Ed. 1972).
Vol. 33:21
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ments made to doctors for preparation of their testimony; 31 recorded recol-
lection though memory is not completely gone; 32 records of "regularly
conducted activities" in addition to businesses and professions and including
conclusions or opinions; 33 reports of public agencies (relating to the agency's
activities or to matters observed pursuant to law, or setting forth findings, in
certain cases); 34 ancient documents though only 20 years old; 35 market
reports; 36  commercial publications; 37  treatises; 38  certain judgments; 39
former testimony although traditional requirements relating to identity of
issues and parties have not been complied with;40 statements under belief
of impending death in more cases than traditionally allowed; 4 statements
against interests in addition to pecuniary and proprietary; 42 and any other
3
'Rule 803(4), ADVISORY COMMITTEE'S NOTE, 56 F.R.D. 183, 306. Contra, Brown v. Blauvelt, 152 Conn. 272,
205 A.2d 773 (1964).32Rule 803(5). Contra: Gray v. Nathan, 221 So.2d 859 (La. App. 1969).
33Rule 803(6) and (7). For proposed amendment of this, see Appendix to this article. Compare 28 U.S.C. §1732.
For critical discussion of the traditional law, see EMERSON, BUSINESS ENTRIES: STATUS UNDER THE UNIFORM RULES AND
PRESENT LAW, 26 U. CINN. L. REV 276 (1961); GREEN, DECISIONS UNDER TIlEGEORGIA RECORDS ACT OF 1952,21 GA. B.J.
211 (1958); SKOGSTAD & KOPPA, ADMISSIBILITY OF BUSINESS ENTRIES, 1958 Wis. L. REV. 245, GREEN, BUSINESS ENTRIES
AS EVIDENCE, 16 GA. B. J. 383 (1954); HUFF, THE NEW GEORGIA BUSINESS ENTRIES ACT, 4 MERCER L. REV. 313 (1953);
GINSBURG, THE ADMISSIBILITY OF BUSINESS RECORDS IN EVIDENCE, 29 NEB. L. REV. 60 (1949). See also Comment, 36
BROOK. L. R. 241 (1970); Comment, 33 GEO. L. J. 349 (1945); Comment, 17 So. CAL. L. REV. 165 (1944); Comment,
18 So. CAL. L_ REV. 60 (1944); Comment, 31 GEO. L. J. 338 (1943); Note, 48 N.C.L. REV. 687 (1970); Note, 35 U.
CoLo. L. REV. 221 .1963); Note, 51 GEO. L. J. 390 (1963), Note, 61 MICH. L. REV. 1369 (1963); Note, 45 VA. L. REV.
717 (1959); Note, 47 GEO. L. J. 747 (1959); Note, 60 W. VA. L. REV. 321 (1958); Note, 1957 U. ILL. L. F. 484; Note,
49 N.W.U.L. REV. 496 (1954); Note, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 920 (1948); Note, 59 HARV. L. REV. 566 (1946); Note, 43
COLUM. L. REV. 392 (1943); Note, 41 MIctl. L. REV. 996 (1943).
For cases citing the various drafts of the Federal Rules of Evidence relating to business records, see Gaussen v.
United Fruit Co., 412 F.2d 72, 74, 75 (2d Cir. 1969) (Rule 803(b)(6)); Sabatino v. Curtiss Nat'l Bank, 415 F.2d 632,
636-637 (5th Cir. 1969) (Rule 803(b)(7)); United States v. Burruss, 418 F.2d 677 (4th Cir. 1969) (Rule 803(b)(6)); Lind-
heimer v. United Fruit Co., 418 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1969) (Rule 803(b)(7)); United States v. De Georgia, 420 F.2d 889
(9th Cir. 1969) (Rule 803(b)(7)); Leon v. Penn Cent. Co., 428 F.2d 528 (7th Cir. 1970) (Rule 803(b)(6)); Mitchell v.
American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 430 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir. 1970) (Rule 803(b)(6)); United States v. Bohle, 445
F.2d 54 (7th Cir. 1971) (Rules 803(6), 805); United States v. Stonehouse, 452 F.2d 455 (7th Cir. 1971) (Rule 803(6));
Ross v. American Export lsbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 453 F.2d 1199 (1972) (Rule 803(6)).
34Rule 803(8). Contra, Franklin v. Skelly Oil Co., 141 F.2d 568 (10th Cir. 1944).
"
t
Rule 803(16). Compare requirement as set forth in 7 WIGMORE §2145(a) (usually 30 yrs. old).
36Rule 803(17). See 6 WIGMORE §1702-1706.
37Rule 803(17). See 6 WIGMORE §1702-1706.31Rule 803(18). Contra, Goodnight v. Phillips, 458 S.W.2d 196 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970); Brown v. United States,
419 F.2d 337 (8th Cir. 1969).31Rules 803(22) and (23). Cf. Annot. 18 A.L.R.2d 1287; Patterson v. Gains, 47 U.S. 550 (1847).
40Rule 804(b)(1). For proposed amendment of this, see Appendix to this article. For discussion of the traditional
rule, see MARTIN, THE FORMER TESTIMONY EXCEPTION IN THE PROPOSED FEDERAL RULES ON EVIDENCE, 57 IOWA L. REV.
547 (1972); WILLIAMSON, PRIOR RECORDED TESTIMONY EXCEPTION To 'HE HEARSAY RULE IN CRIMINAL CASES IN STATE
AND FEDERAL COURTS, 6 CRIM. L. BULl 179 (1970); SMITII & PHELPS, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ANNOTATION TO THE
PROPOSED FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, 32 FED. BAR J. 270, 354 (1973); LETWIN, WAIVER OF OBJECTIONS TO FORMER
TESTIMONY, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 118 (1967); FAULKNOR, THE HEARSAY RULE AND ITS EXCEPTIONS, 2 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
43, 57 (1954); ISAACSON, USE OF FORMER TESTIMONY, 1945 Wis. L. REV. 445; HALE, TtIE MISSOURI LAW RELATIVE 10
THE USE OF TESTIMONY GIVEN AT A FORMER TRIAL, 14 ST. Louis L. REV. 375 (1929). See also Note, 10 KAN. CITY L.
REV. 257 (1972); Note, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 666 (1971); Note, 17 J.A.G. J. 122 (1963); Note, 11 W_ RES. L. REV. 471
(1960); Note, 41 GEo. L. J. 747 (1959); Note, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 555 (1955); Note, 49 N.W.U. L. REV. 489 (1954).
For cases see Wilson v. Marshall Enterprises, 361 F.2d 887 (4th Cir. 1966); Wolf v. United Airlines, 12 F.R.D. I
(M.D.Pa. 1951); Collins v. Dilchur, 104 Ariz. 221, 450 P.2d 679 (1969); Houston Fire & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Brittian,
402 S.W.2d 509 (Tex. 1966); Fleury v. Edwards 14 N.Y.S. 2d 334, 200 N.E.2d 550 (1964); McDonnell v. United
States, 472 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir. 1973) (Citing Rule 804(b)(1), (a) (3)).
"lRule 804(b)(3). For proposed amendment of this see Appendix to this article. See 5 WIGMORE §1443.
'
2
Rule 804(b)(4). For proposed amendment of this see Appendix to this article. For discussion of the traditional
rule, see MORGAN, DECLARATIONS AGAINST INTEREST, 5 VAND. L. REV. 451 (1952); JEFFERSON, DECLARATIONS AGAINST
INTEREST: AN EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE, 58 HARV. L. REV. I (1944); Comment, 16 N.Y. L.F. 504 (1970);
Comment, 62 N.W.U. L. REV. 934 (1968); Comment, 98 U. Pa. L. REV. 755 (1950); Comment, 5 Tulsa L. J. 302 (1968);
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hearsay statement deemed "comparabl[y] trustworthy" to those listed. 43
In addition, the list of self-authenticating documents has been ex-
panded; 44 authentication requirements in other instances have been eased; 45
and the Best Evidence rule has been relaxed to allow, in most instances, 46
reliable documentary copies such as xeroxes. 47
In view of the emphasis on admissibility, it is surprising that the Rules
did not provide specific guidance opening the way to admissibility of lie
detector evidence48  and other comparable scientific evidence. 49 There may,
however, be some such implication in the Rules' expanded receptivity to
expert evidence (Article VII) and to opinion evidence of character for sub-
stantive and credibility purposes (Rules 405 and 608). Conceivably a lie
detector operator may be in a position to offer such an opinion.50
Without expressing a value judgment either way, it should be noted that
a general liberalization favoring admissibility works against the criminal
WVard v. H. S. Pitt & Co., L R. 119131 2 K.B. 130; Higham v. Ridgeway, 10 East 109 (1808). See also HINTON,
CHANGES IN EXCEPTIONS TO THE HEARSAY RULE, 29 ILL. L. REV. 422 (1934); Comment, ADMISSIBILITY OF CONFESSIONS
OF A THIRD PARTY, 3 ALA. L. REV. 384 (1951); Comment, 15 U. COLO. L. REV. 714 (1915); Comment, I IowA L REV.
196 (1915); Note, 52 CORN. L. Q. 301 (1967); Note, 20 RoCKY MOUNTAIN L. REV. 97 (1947); Note, 21 MINN. L. REV.
181 (1937); Sutter v. Easterly, 354 Mo. 282, 189 S.W.2d 284 (1945); In re Baird, 193 Cal. 225, 223 P. 974 (1924);
Hines v. Commonwealth, 136 Va. 728, 117 S.E. 893 (1923); Weber v. Chicago Ry. Co., 175 Iowa 358, 151 N.W. 852
(1915); Hamberg-Bremen Fire Ins. Co. v. Ohio Valley Dry Goods Co.'s Trustee, 160 Ky. 252, 169 S.W. 724 (1914);
Halvorsen v. Moon & Kerr Lumber Co., 87 Minn- 18, 91 N.W. 28 (1902).
For cases citing provisions of Rule 804(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Evidence in various drafts, see United States v.
Seyfried, 435 F.2d 6 96 (7th Cir. 1971) (Rule 804(b)(4)); Continental Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Sherman, 439 F.2d 1294 (5th
Cir. 1971) (Rule 804(b)(4)); United States v. Lopez-Cruz, 470 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1972) (Rule 804(b)(4)); United States
v. Glenn, 473 F.2d 191 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Rules 804(b)(4), 803(2), 806, 104(a)); Chambers v. Mississippi, 93 S.Ct. 1038
(1973) (Rules 607, 804(b)(4)).
43Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(6), recently proposed to be deleted. See Appendix hereto. On the subject of liberalizing
the hearsay rule generally, see HARDIN, MODIFICA[ION OF TIlE HEARSAY RULF, 45 AusT. L. J. 531 (1971); BOOKER &
MORTON, THE HEARSAY RULE, TIlE ST. GEORGE PLAYS AND TIlE ROAD TO TIlE YEAR 2050, 44 NOrRE DAME LAWvyER
7 (1968); ORFIELD, TIlE HEARSAY RULE IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES, 32 FORD. L. RiV. 499, 769 (1964); 'vIC~iRE,
HEARSAY OBSCURITY; GLIMMERS OF DAYLIGIIT, 3 N.H.BJ. 145 (1961); McGUIRE, HERESY ABOUT HEARSAY, 8 U. Cii.
L. RE. 621 (1941); Comment, 55 IOwsA L. REV. 477 (1970); Comment, HEARSAY UNDER TIE PROPOSED FEDERAL RtLES
OF EVIDENCE-A DISCRETIONARY APPROACIH, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 1077 (1969): Note, 52 CORN. L. Q. 301 (1967).
See also United States v. Barbati, 284 F. Supp. 409 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F.
Supp. 670 (S.D.NY. 1963); Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assur. Co., 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1961); McMillen
Feed Co. v. Harlow, 405 S.W.2d 123 (Tex. 1966); Chestnut v. Ford Motor Co., 445 F.2d 967 (4th Cir. 1971) (citing
the Federal Rules of Evidence); Hew v. Aruda, 51 Hawaii 451, 462 P.2d 476 (1969) (citing the Federal Rules of Evidence);
Woll v. Dugas, 104 NJ. Super. 586, 250 A.Zd 775 (1969); Jastremsky v. General Motors Corp., 109 NJ. Super. 31,
262 A.2d 218 (1970); A.L.I. Model Code of Evidence Rule 503 (1942); Nat'l Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 63(4)(c), (1953); New Jersey Supreme Court Rules of Evidence, Rule 63(32)
(1965); Calif. Evid. Code §§1260, 1261 (1965).
In addition to the above liberalizations of the hearsay rule, Article VIII also excludes non-assertive conduct from the
definition of hearsay, unlike some decisions. Compare Rule 801 (a)(2) with Wright v. Doe d. Tatham, 7 Ad. and El. 313
(H.L. 1838).
"4Rule 902.
"1Rule 901(b), especially (3), (6), and (8). See ADVISORY COM MITTEE NOTES, 56 F.R.D. 183, 333-335.
4"Except where there is a "genuine question" raised as to authenticity of the original.
"7Rules 1003; 1001(4). The Best Evidence rule is relaxed in a number of other respects as well. See Rules 1005,
1006.
isSee United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Mich. 1972) (on subsequent unreported hearing, evidence
not admissible); United States v. Zeiger, 350 F. Supp. 685 (D.DC. 1972), reod on appeal, 475 F2d 1280 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
49See Trimble v. Hedman, 291 Minn. 442, 192 N.W.2d 432 (1971); United States v. Raymond, 337 F. Supp. 641
(D.D.C. 1972). The rules do attempt in several places to spell out how they would apply to modern devices such as
x-rays, films, recordings, videotapes, and computer materials. See Rules 901(b)(7), (8), (9), 902(4), 1001, 1003, 803(6),
(7), (8), (9), (10).
5Could the same be said of an F.B.I. agent who interviewed the accused or interviewed a witness favorable to the
accused? Could the same be said of a psychiatrist stationed in the gallery to hear and pass on a witness or on the accused,
as in the Alger Hiss trial?
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accused in at least two ways: (1) It makes it more difficult for the defense to
rely on the prosecution's inability to meet its burden. Greater admissibility
means it is easier to put in evidence to meet the burden. (2) A cutting down
of exclusionary principles hurts the defense because some judges administer
exclusionary rules in a way favorable to the defense. These judges exclude
prosecution evidence but not defense evidence because only exclusion of de-
fense evidence or admission of prosecution evidence carries any risk of
reversal, owing to the fact that no appeal lies by the prosecution.
51
II. SHIFTING THE BURDEN OF INVESTIGATION
An apparently ignored by-product of the increased admissibility in some
areas, is that an investigation or preparation burden formerly on the pro-
ponent of evidence, will be placed on the opponent.
a. Rules relating to experts.
As described above, an effect of Article VII is to deprive one who wishes
to challenge an expert opinion, of information he formerly obtained "up
front" in the expert's direct examination: the hypothetical facts and/or other
bases for the opinion (including personal examination, textbooks, x-rays,
consultations, etc.). True, he can get the information on cross examination,5"
but it would be tactically unwise to tackle these matters for the first time in
cross-examination. The only alternative for the challenger is to obtain it be-
fore the trial, through discovery, and through other investigation of the field of
expertise. In other words, the challenger must put in more pre-trial time and
expense than he might otherwise have thought the magnitude of the case or
his client's budget warranted.
He may not be able to effectively gather the information before trial
because of legal strictures on discovery. In criminal cases there is as yet no
provision for pre-trial notice that an expert will be called, 53 nor for dis-
covery respecting the government's experts except in the narrow situations
covered by Rules 15 and 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. In
civil cases, discovery respecting opponents' experts is limited to the right to
a cursory written statement prepared by the party who will offer the expert
testimony, with greater discovery allowed only at the discretion of the judge
and at financial risk to the discoverer. 54
b. Hearsay.
As noted above, Article VIII alters the hearsay rule and its exceptions
to let in significantly more evidence that would be regarded as inadmissible
hearsay by many courts today. This means there will be more instances in
which the declarant (the "invisible witness" who made the statement) or
background facts or details about him or his circumstances, will have to be
searched out and brought forward by he who wishes to challenge the hearsay
5'Cf. text infra following note 91 el seq.
"Rule 705.
S3Compare with FEDERAL EVIDENCE RULES 702-705, UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 57.
"4FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 26(b)(4)(A)(i) and (ii).
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statement. 5 If the hearsay rule applied to bar the evidence unless the
proponent of the evidence brought the "invisible witness" forward, and the
proponent thus brought him forward, the job of the opponent in exploring
the validity and circumstances of his statement would be considerably
facilitated.
c. Authentication and Best Evidence
Article IX relaxes authentication requirements in a number of respects,
e.g., expanding the list of self-authenticating documents, as noted above.
Instead of the proponent of the document having to make out a case of
genuiness and come forward with witnesses or other material on that issue
(which witnesses and material can be questioned or explored), the opponent,
if he wishes to attack genuiness, must search out the material and witnesses
himself. The burden is exceptionally heavy if the "document" happens to be
computerized information requiring sophisticated programs for its retrieval
and retrieval of related information. 56 If it happens to be information in pro-
ponent's own business computer banks, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34(a)
would require that it be furnished by proponent in "reasonably under-
standable" form in response to a motion to produce, although nothing is
provided concerning who bears the cost.
Article X (Best Evidence) relaxes the requirement of the original docu-
ment in several ways, and accepts xeroxes and similar copies quite freely, as
described above. Since proof of forgery, falsification, alteration and the like
will ordinarily require the original, 57 the burden is on the challenger to
obtain it. Additionally, in some instances he may not be able to do so. The
computer problem mentioned above also rears its head here.
58
Research should be done to determine the impact of shifting the investi-
gation-preparation burden to the challenger in the above several areas.
Does it tend to favor the large corporate or governmental litigant at the
expense of the small litigant of limited means? Is the shifting particularly
inappropriate where the evidence is sought to be used against the criminal
accused? Does the shifting necessitate a re-evaluation of the rules and prac-
tices respecting government subsidization of an accused's investigation and
preparation expenses? Does the shifting necessitate a re-examination of the
rules and practice respecting allocation of costs of investigation and discov-
ery in civil cases? These questions seem to have been given little attention.
55Rule 806 provides for "impeachment" of the declarant's credibility. Cf. ENGUSH CIVIL EVIDENCE ACT, 1968, c.
64; Order 38, Rules 20-33, THE ENGLISH SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, FOURTH CUMMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT (FEB. 1971);
and proposals in the ELEVENTH REPORT (EVIDENCE) OF THE CRIMINAL LAW REVISION COMMITTEE OF GREAT BRITAIN
(June, 1972). These provide for advance notice (with relevant particulars concerning the declarant and his statement) of
intent to use hearsay.
"Rules 901(b)(7), (8), (9), and 902(4), bring computer materials within the rules relating to authentication of
documents.
57See OSBORN, QUESTIONED DOCUMENTS, chs. 1, 5-6, 9, 25-29 (2d ed. 1929). The author of the present article is
reliably informed that this classic work is about to be issued in new edition and that questioned document examiners still
do require the original for effective work.
"8Rules 1001 and 1005 bring computer materials within the Best Evidence rule.
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I1. FAVORING GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS IN THE PRIVILEGE AREA
Under Article V, if a man cannot afford a psychiatrist but rather has
only his wife to confide in, he gets no privilege. So too if he takes his tax
problems to a supermarket accountant instead of a tax lawyer. 5 9 Even con-
fiding in an ordinary doctor rather than a (more expensive) psychiatrist may
not be safe.60 Meanwhile, a corporation can claim a trade secrets privilege,6
a required reports privilege,6 2 and, on an extremely broad basis, an attorney-
client privilege.6 3 And the government has a sweeping state secrets privilege
that requires little more than an executive assertion that a secret is in-
volved; 64 has a privilege covering, essentially, any other "official informa-
tion; ' 65 and has an extensive identity-of-informers privilege covering inform-
ants not only to law enforcement officers, but to legislative committees as
well, and covering not only informants who furnish information revealing
violations of law but also those furnishing information "relating to or assist-
ing in an investigation of a possible violation of law." 66 This privilege pro-
tecting sources of information to government is accorded at the same time as
a similar privilege protecting sources of information to newspapers is denied
in the Rules.
Whatever one may think of the justifiability of all this, it is apparent
immediately that the policy of increased admissibility has been effectuated
in Article V principally through restriction of the personal or individual
privileges rather than the privileges accruing to organizations. It should be
noted that Article V has been proposed to be amended, though not in a way
that attempts to solve the difficult policy issues presented. Rather, the pro-
posed amendments defer to state law and case by case development. 67
In connection with the privileges of corporations in the Supreme Court-
approved draft, particular attention should be given to the attorney-client
privilege. While it is generally agreed that corporations may claim an attor-
ney-client privilege, 6 the drafters passed up an opportunity to codify the
more restrictive of the two prevailing views as to which employees of the
corporation may make protected communications to the corporation's law-
yers-the "control group" view which confines it to those persons authorized
59CJ. Hearings, Rules of Evidence, Before the Special Subcommittee on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, Feb.
7, 8, 22, 28; March 9, 15, 1973, at 195.
"The only medical privilege provided is a psychotherapist-patient privilege. Rule 504. Although "psychothera-
pist" is defined broadly to include any physician while treating a mental or emotional condition (Rule 504(a)(2)), courts
will interpret this with varying degrees of liberality. (Query whether there is not always an emotional or mental aspect
or consequence or adjustment even to the most clearly physical ailment, e.g., a broken bone set in a cast).
,,Rule 508.
6Rule 502.
63Rule 503. See particularly 503(a)(1) and discussion infra.
"Rule 509, particularly 509(a)(1) and (b), and end of second paragraph of Advisory Committee Note.
65Rule 509, particularly 509(a)(2) and (b).
"Rule 510. See generally, Comments, 7 WASHBURN L. J. 114 (1967); 64 J. CRIM. L. 56 (1973); 1967 DUKE L. J.
888; Note, 17 HAST. L. J. 99 (1966). See also QUINN, MCCRAY V. ILLINOIS; PROBABLE CAUSE AND INFORMERS PRIVILEGE,
45 DENVER L. J. 399 (1968); Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528 (1964).
6"See Appendix hereto. See also ROTHSTEIN, THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE,
62 GEO. L.J. 125 (1973).
"Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Amer. Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314 (6th Cir. 1963); Comment, 56 N.W.U. L. REV. 235
(1961).
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to seek and act on legal advice, 69 as opposed to the "directed, job re-
lated" view which expands it to encompass, additionally, any employee
communication of a legal nature directed to be made by corporate authority
if related to the employee's work.70 Instead of making a choice of views, the
drafters left the matter to case development. Although originally prescribing
the "control group" view,7' they abandoned this when, without opinion, an
equally divided Supreme Court refused to overturn a lower court ruling
adopting the "directed, job related" view.72
The drafters of the attorney-client privilege in the Federal Rules of
Evidence also passed up an opportunity to define the right of shareholders
to overcome corporate claims of attorney-client privilege, or to assert the
privilege; and to define the extent to which communications to attorneys who
participate in a corporation's business decisions, e.g., as officers or directors,
are privileged.
In addition, it would seem that the drafting of Article V of the Federal
Rules of Evidence would provide an excellent opportunity for an empirical
study of some of the psychological and other assumptions underlying the
various traditional privileges or underlying their revision or abolition-
assumptions pertaining to, for example, the questions of whether privileges
encourage fuller communication and information, facilitate certain services
and relationships, foster the seeking of professional help, and correspond
to popular notions of fairness. Such an opportunity was not taken, al-
though the fault, of course, is not with the drafters, but rather perhaps with
the conception and funding of the project.
IV. BROAD GRANTS OF DISCRETIONARY POWERS
It has been rumored that several members of the Advisory Committee
felt that the Federal Rules of Evidence would be more appropriately titled
"the Federal Non-Rules of Evidence." If the story is not apocryphal, what
they were probably referring to is the Rules' broad grant of discretion to
judges. For example, Rule 403, which apparently cuts across the entire body
of the Rules, allows ad hoc exclusion where prejudice, time, and the like are
deemed to outweigh probativity. Rule 611 grants judges tremendous dis-
cretion in matters formerly subject to at least some type of rules. The
discretion covers mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting
evidence, including, inter alia, leading questions, scope of cross examination,
scope and permissibility of re-direct examination, and scope and permissi-
"City of Phila. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
"Harper & Row Publ., Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970) affirmed by equally divided court without
opinion, 400 U.S. 955 (1971), rehearing denied, 401 U.S. 950 (1971).
7'See Rule 503(a)(3) in Drafts of March, 1971, and March, 1969. The Nevada Evidence Code, Nevada Rev. Stat.
tit. 4, ch. 47-52 (1971), modelled on the Federal Rules of Evidence Draft of March, 1969, incorporates this view. Because
modelled on the early draft, the Nevada Code also limits, as that draft did, "lawyer's representative" (to whom privileged
communications may be made) to one employed by the lawyer to assist legal services.
72Harper & Row Publ., Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), 400 U.S. 955 (1971), rehearing denied, 401
U.S. 950 (1971).
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bility of rebuttal and surrebuttal.7 3 Rule 701 allows lay opinion if "ration-
ally" based on perception and if "helpful." Rule 702 sets up the test for
expert testimony: will it "assist" the trier of fact? Rule 703 allows opinions
based on inadmissible evidence if that evidence is of the type "reasonably"
relied upon by experts in the field. Rule 705 grants discretion to require
disclosure (on direct examination) of facts or data underlying an expert
opinion. Rule 706 leaves it up to the judge when to appoint and call his own
experts. Rule 803(24) and 804(b)(6) confer broad discretion to manufacture
new exceptions to the hearsay rule based on trustworthiness. Other provi-
sions of Rules 803 and 804 expressly confer power to exclude evidence other-
wise within hearsay exceptions if deemed untrustworthy. 74 Rule 901 (b) allows
authentication by means other than those listed in the rule. Rule 1003 allows
duplicates if the judge does not feel there is a "genuine" question as to au-
thenticity. Rule 1006 grants broad discretion to allow summaries of docu-
ments. Other examples appear in the margin. 75
A number of questions can be raised respecting such broad discretion:
1. Does it presuppose an extraordinarily qualified judiciary? If we
have such a judiciary in federal courts, do we also have it in state courts at
all levels? The Proposed Federal Rules will be used as a model for the states.
2. Does it render vain the hope that the Federal Rules of Evidence will
supply a ready guide, between two covers, for busy trial lawyers in the hurly
burly of daily litigation? Doesn't it mean that existing evidence case law and
authorities will still have to be consulted and will still control in determining
what factors should govern discretion and what is and is not a permissible
exercise of discretion?
3. If not, doesn't broad discretion in the trial judge mean that appellate
courts will have wide power to reverse for nothing more precise than "abuse
of discretion" whenever they are dissatisfied with the result below for any
reason, properly within appellate cognizance or not?
4. Does discretion mean there will be disuniformity, unpredictability,
and inability on the part of lawyers to prepare their cases, advise their clients
with certainty, or estimate or proportion efforts and expenses to the worth
of the case?
V. INFLUENCE OF NATIONAL ATTITUDE TOWARD CRIME
There is a trend today in the law of criminal evidence and procedure
away from protecting the accused. Rightly or wrongly, this is apparently
seen as one economical and effective measure to help stem the rising crime
rate.
"See ROTtiSTEIN, UNDERSTANDING TiE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, 63 (1973).
,'E.g., Rules 803(6), (7), and (8).
75See Rule 104(c) (when are preliminary matters out of hearing of jury);,Rule 1051(codifying and endorsing the
rarely used power of Federal trial judges to comment on the weight of the evidence); Rule 303 (criminal presumptions-
submission to jury never mandatory); Rules 508-510 (trade secrets and governmental privileges, giving the judge power
to make certain orders as justice may require); Rules 405-406, 608-609 (character, habit, misconduct, convictions, both
substantive and for impeachment; necessarily implying a great amount of discretion); Rule 613 (manner and timing of
foundation for prior inconsistent statement); Rule 614 (judge's power to call and interrogate witnesses).
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The trend is discernible in the decisions of the Supreme Court in the
period immediately preceding the Court's promulgation of the Federal Rules
of Evidence. For example, questions respecting such matters as police stop-
and-frisk authority,7 6 the breadth of immunity required to compel self-
incriminatory testimony,77 the right to counsel, 78 procedures respecting proof
of voluntariness of confessions,79  "harmlessness" of evidentiary constitutional
error,80 and non-unanimous verdicts,8 were all resolved against the accused,
although, on the other side, the prosecutor's limited duty to disclose was
affirmed, 82 the most questionable extension of the executive's power to wire-
tap was restricted, 83 convictions in violation of the right to counsel were for-
bidden to be used as impeachment, 84 certain kinds of statutes were voided for
vagueness, 85 and the defendant's rights to transcripts, 86 to fairness in plea
bargaining,87 to fair juries, 88 and to testify at a point in trial of his own
choosing, 89 were affirmed or expanded. In addition, the death penalty was
severely curtailed if not abolished. 90 The gains for the accused seem, how-
ever, to be the kind that could hardly be denied him in a civilized, developed
society.
Similar forces appear to be at work in Britain, as well. The Eleventh
Report (Evidence) of the Criminal Law Revision Committee of Great Britain,
June, 1972, recommends vastly increased reception of hearsay despite lack
of confrontation; freer use of an accused's station-house or courtroom silence
as evidence against him; and curtailment of police warnings, the "fruit of
the poisonous tree" doctrine, criminal corroboration requirements, and the
availability of the spousal and self-incrimination privileges. 9'
S6Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972). See United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (governmental
power to have regulatory inspections of gun dealers' premises).
77Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972) (the privilege against self-incrimination may be overcome by a
grant of immunity from use of the testimony and fruits thereof; immunity from prosecution for the transaction not
required).
78Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (right to counsel at line-ups limited to post-indictment or post-charge
line-ups). See Adams v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 278 (1972) (right to counsel at preliminary hearing not retroactive). Cf. Neil v.
Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972) (totality of circumstances and exigencies makes suggestive identification admissible).
71Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972) (burden of proof on the government to prove the voluntariness of confes-
sions fixed at "preponderance of the evidence" rather than "beyond a reasonable doubt"; also deciding that it is not con-
stitutionally required that the jury pass on voluntariness after the judge has determined the confession to be voluntary).
°"'Harmlessness" was made easier to find. See Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427 (1972); Milton v. Wainwright,
407 U.S. 371 (1972).
tiNon-unanimous verdicts were approved as constitutional. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
s2Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (obligation on prosecutor to disclose unfavorable matters). But see
Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 (1972) (limiting such obligation).
5 3United States v. United States Dist. Court, E.D. Mich., 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (rejecting power of executive to
wiretap without warrant in domestic subversion cases).
84Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473 (1972).
SsPapachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972), and Smith v. Florida, 405 U.S. 172 (1972) (voiding certain
kinds of vagrancy statutes); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972) (voiding certain kinds of abusive language statutes).
s6Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971).
8TSantobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971) (voiding a guilty plea due to government default in performing the
terms of a plea bargain agreement).
88Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972), and Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972) (confirming the unconstitu-
tionality of racially slanted .juries).
89Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972) (defendant wishing to testify cannot be required to do so as first
witness).
90Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
9iThe Report suggests other interesting reforms, many similar to or in areas dealt with by the Federal Rules of
Evidence, e.g., opinion testimony, competency of children, foundation for prior inconsistent writings, and character
evidence (substantive and credibility). There are also suggestions concerning production and persuasion burdens respect-
ing affirmative defenses.
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The same forces seem to have had some influence on the Federal Rules
of Evidence, particularly on the draft that was finally approved by the Su-
preme Court. (Earlier efforts of the Advisory Committee to resist are chron-
icled elsewhere. 92)
Some of the Rules manifest the forces more than others. Rule 104(c) was
altered in the final draft to deny the accused an absolute right to a hearing
out of jury range on preliminary matters. 93 Rule 2 01(g) pertaining to
judicial notice allows binding instructions against the accused on matters of
fact. 94 Rule 510 accords a broad privilege covering identity of informers. 95
Rule 607, allowing free impeachment of one's own witness, will benefit pri-
marily the prosecution, who frequently must rely on turncoat or hostile wit-
nesses. Rule 609 allows very broad impeachment by prior convictions. It
contains insufficient regulation of the kind of conviction, to insure that only
the most probative are used. For example, it allows involuntary manslaugh-
ter convictions. Further, it provides that extremely old convictions can be
revived by minor and irrelevant recent convictions. 96 While earlier drafts
conferred on the judge an ad hoc power to override the rule and exclude for
undue prejudice (for example, where an old involuntary manslaughter con-
viction is offered against a criminal accused who is a witness for himself
in a trial on similar charges), this veto power was deleted from the final
draft. 97 Rule 801(d)(1) allows prior inconsistent statements of witnesses to
92 ROTISTEIN, THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, 62 CEO. L.J. 125 (1973).
"3Amendments to this have been proposed. See Appendix hereto.
94This rule, relating to judicial notice, has been proposed to be amended. See Appendix hereto. See generally,
DAVIS, AN APPROACH TO PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE IN TIlE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 404-407
(1942); DAVIS, JUDICIAl NOTICE, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 945 (1955); DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, ch. 15 (1958);
DAVIS, A SYSTEM OF JUDICIAL NOTICE BASED ON FAIRNESS AND CONVENIENCE in PRESPECTIVE OF LAW 69 (1964); DAVIS,
JUDICIAL NOTICE, 1969 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 513; ROBERTS, PRELIMINARY NOTES TOWARD A STUDY OF JUDICIAL NOTICE, 52
CORN. L. Q. 210 (1967); MORGAN, JUDICIAL NOTICE, 57 HARV. L. REV. 269 (1944); ORFIEID, JUDICIAL NOTICE IN
FEDERAl CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS, 31 FORD. L. REV. 503 (1963); SLOVENKO, EESTABLISHING THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-
TIHE BURDEN OF PROOF AND JUDICIAL NOTICE, 31 TUI. L. REV. 173 (1956); See also Comment, 13 VILL. L. REV. 528
(1968); Note, JUDICIAL NOTICE IN THE PROPOSED FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, 1969 WASIH. U.L.Q. 453; Note, 21
BAYLOR L. REV. 208 (1969). See also FREEMAN, TRIAL LAWYER UTILIZES THE CONCEPTS OF JUDICIAL NOTICE AND PRE-
SUMPTIONS, 8 TRIAL LAW Q. 49 (1971).
"Rule 510. See Appendix hereto for proposed amendments. See also note 66, Supra.
5 Rule 609(b). See Appendix hereto for proposed amendments.
Compare Rule 609(a) in draft of March, 1971, with Supreme Court-approved draft. The veto power has been
proposed to be at least partly reinstated by amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Appendix hereto. This veto
power is the famous "Luck" power, Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965), overruled by Congress in 14
D.C. Code §305 (1973). See, SMITH & PIIELPS, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ANNOTATION TO THE PROPOSED FEDERAL RULES
OF EVIDENCE, 32 FED. BAR.J. 270, 326 (1973).
See, for cases embracing the power, United States v. Palumbo, 401 F.2d 270 (2d Cir. 1968); People v. Montgomery,
47 111.2d 510, 268 N.E. 2d 695 (1971). For cases that have rejected the power, see Commonwealth v. West, 357 Mass.
245, 258 N.E. 2d 22 (1970); State v. Hawthorne, 49 N.J. 130, 228 A.2d 682 (1967). Note that in Berg v. United States,
406 F.2d 235 (9th Cir. 1969) there was a three way split, one judge criticizing the power, another approving it and a
third refusing to make a choice. The Second Circuit has embraced the power. See United States v. Puco, 453 F.2d 539
(2d Cir. 1971); United States v. DiLorenzo, 429 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 950 (1971). These rulings
are consistent with the skepticism expressed in some Second Circuit opinions (notably by Judge Friendly) about the
jury's ability to apply the lawyer's Finely wrought distinction between the use of evidence for substantive and for im-
peachment purposes. See, e.g., United States v. DeSisto, 329 F.2d at 933 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied 377 U.S. 979
(1965) where that skepticism was advanced as a reason for allowing former statements of witnesses made at grand jury
or similar proceedings to come in substantively as well as on the issue of credibility.
This area has been quite controversial and has engendered considerable discussion. See, e.g., CHANDLER, ATTACK-
ING CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES BY PROOF OF CHARGE OF CONVICTION OF CRIME, 10 TEX. L. REV. 257 (1932); EHRHARDT,
USE OF PRIOR CONVICTION TO IMPEACH THE DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL CASE, 10 THE JUDGES JOURNAL 45 (1971);
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be used substantively. This benefits primarily prosecutors, since the prosecu-
tion is in the best position to obtain such statements and often must rely on
turncoat or hostile witnesses.98 Rule 804(b)(1), dealing with the admissibil-
ity of former testimony, dispenses with requirements of party or issue iden-
tity. It seems to infringe the concept of confrontation.9 9 Rule 804(b)(4), in
a reversal of its original position, allows third party admissions to be used
against the accused, but not for him unless corroborated. 100 Rules 803(24)
and 804(b)(6) allow any substantially trustworthy hearsay to be admitted,
without any special consideration of the need for confrontation in criminal
cases. 101
CONCLUSION
One final "theme" that is inherent in the very conception of the Rules,
is, of course, the belief that uniformity in the field of Evidence amongst
all federal courts, is preferable to conformity to state law of the state where
the federal court happens to be. The literature on this battle has been ex-
tensive, 10 2 and there will be no attempt here to recapitulate the arguments
LADD, CREDIBILITY TEST-CURRENT TRENDS, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 166, 174 (1940); LADD, TECHNIQUES AND THEORY OF
CHARACTER TESTIMONY, 24 IOWA L. REV. 498 (1939); McGOWEN, IMPEACHMENT OF CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS BY PRIOR
CONVICTIONS, 1970 ARIZ. ST. L. J., LAW & SOCIAL ORDER 1; ORFIELD, IMPEACHMENT AND SUPPORT OF WITNESSES IN
FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES, 11 KAN. L. REV. 447 (1963); SPECTOR, IMPEACHING THE DEFENDANT BY His PRIOR CONVIC-
TIONS AND THE PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE: A HALF-STEP FORWARD AND THIREE STEPS BACKWARD, I LOYOLA L..J.
247 (1970); SPECTOR, IMPEACHMENT THROUGH PAST CONVICTIONS: A TIME FOR REFORM, 18 DEPAUL L. REV. 1 (1968);
WOODBRIDGE, THE EFFECT IN VIRGINIA OF CONVICTION OF CRIME ON COMPETENCY AND CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES, 23
VA. L. REV. 417 (1937); COMMENT, IMPEACIIMENT OF WITNESS CREDIBILITY BY USE OF PAST CONVICTION EVIDENCE,
59 Ky. L. J. 514 (1970); COMMENT, IMPEACHMENT OF THE DEFENDANT WITNESS BY PRIOR CONVICTIONS, 12 ST. LOUIS
U.Lj. 277 (1968); COMMENT, ADMISSIBILITY OF PRIOR CONVICTIONS OF SIMILAR BUT INDEPENDENT OFFENSES, 9
WASHBURN L. J. 478 (1969); Comment, 31 FORD. L. REV. 797 (1963); Comment 1959 Wts. L. REV. 312; Note, OTHER
CRIMES EVIDENCE AT TRIAL: OF BALANCING AND OTHER MATTERS, 70 YALE L. J. 763 (1961); Note, PRIOR CRIMINAL
CONVICTIONS TO IMPEACH CREDIBILITY IN NEW ENGLAND, 42 B.U.L. REV. 91 (1962); Note, ADMISSIBILITY OF PRIOR
CRIMES EVIDENCE TO IMPEACH A WITNESS IN FLORIDA, 15 U. Fla. L. REV. 220 (1962); Note, PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS OF
THE CRIMINAL DEFENDANT, 78 HARV. L. REV. 426, 440 (1964); Note, USE OF PRIOR CRIMES TO EFFECT CREDIBILITY AND
PENALTY IN PENNSYLVANIA, 113 U. Pa. L. REV. 382 (1965); Note, IMPEACHING THE ACCUSED BY HIS PRIOR CRIMES, 19
HAST. Lj. 919 (1968); Note, AN ECLECTIC APPROACH TO IMPEACHMENT BY PRIOR CONVICTIONS, 5 J. L. REFORM 522
(1972); Note, USE OF PRIOR CONVICTIONS TO IMPEACH THE CREDIBILITY OF THE CRIMINAL DEFENDANT, 71 W. VA. L. REV.
160 (1969); ANNO. 20 A.L.R. 2d 1217 (1951).
For cases citing the various drafts of Federal Rule of Evidence 609, see United States v. Morefield, 411 F.2d 1186,
1188 (7th Cir. 1969) (Rule 609); United States v. Zubkoff, 416 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1969) (Rule 609(b)); United States v.
Cox, 428 F. 2d 683 (7th Cir. 1970) (Rule 609); United States v. Escobedo, 430 F.2d 14 (7th Cir. 1970) (Rule 609); United
States v. Scarpellino, 431 F.2d 475 (8th Cir. 1970) (Rule 609); United States v. Williams, 445 F.2d 421 (10th Cir. 1971)
(Rule 609); United States v. McCarthy, 445 F.2d 587 (7th Cir. 1971) (Rule 609); United States v. Puco, 453 F.2d 539
(2d Cir. 1971) (Rule 609(b)); United States v. Bishop, 457 F.2d 260 (7th Cir. 1972) (Rule 609); United States v. Dow, 457
F.2d 246 (7th Cir. 1972) (Rule 609 (a)); United States v. Tubbs, 461 F.2d 43 (7th Cir. 1972) (Rule 609); United States
v. Gray, 468 F.2d 257 (3d Cir. 1972) (Rule 609(a)); United States v. Greeley, 471 F.2d 25 (3d Cir. 1972) (Rule 609);
United States v. Malasanos, 472 F.2d 642 (7th Cir. 1973) (Rule 609(b)).
98See note 25 supra.
"
5See note 40 supra.
I°See note 42 supra.
a° See note 43 supra.
I02SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE ADVISABILITY AND FEASIBILITY OF A SYSTEM OF UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS (Chairman, Professor james William Moore) OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES,
REPORT, Feb. 12, 1962, endorsing and transmitting Reporter Professor Thomas Green's PRELIMINARY STUDY ON THE AD-
VISABILITY AND FEASIBILITY OF DEVELOPING UNIFORM RULES OP EVIDENCE FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS, 30 F.R.D. 73 (1962);
DEGNAN, THE LAW OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE REFORM, 76 HARV. L. REV. 275 (1962); GREEN, DRAFTING UNIFORM FEDERAL
RULES OF EVIDENCE, 52 CORNELL L. Q. 177 (1967); ORFIELD, UNIFORM FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, 67 DICKINSON
L. REV. 381 (1963); WEINSTEIN, TIlE UNIFORMITY-CONFORMITV DILEMMA FACING DRAFTSMEN OF FEDERAL RULES OF
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pro and con, except to say that the commentators have come out overwhelm-
ingly in favor of uniformity amongst federal courts. It is regrettable that cur-
rently pending proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence have
found it necessary to enlarge the area of deference to state law accorded by
the Supreme Court-approved draft. 0 3 The enlargement embraces state law
of privileges and witness competency in, basically, diversity cases. 104
APPENDIX FOLLOWS
EVIDENCE, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 353 (1969); CLEARY, THE PLAN FOR TlE ADOPTION OF RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR UNITED
STATES DISTRICTS COURTS, 25 TIlE RECORD 142 (1970); SPANENBERG, TIlE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE-AN ATTEMPT
AT UNIFORMITY IN FEDERAL COURTS, I WAYNE L. REV. 1061 (1969); LADD, UNIFORM EVIDENCE RULES IN TIlE FEDERAL
COURTS, 49 VA. L. REV. 692 (1963). See also, ESTES, THE NEED FOR UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE IN FEDERAL COURTS,
24 F.R.D. 331 (1960); JOINER, UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR FEDERAL COURTS, 20 F.R.D. 429 (1957); DEGNAN, THE
FEASIBILITY OF RULES OF EVIDENCE IN FEDERAL COURTS, 24 F.R.D. 341 (1960); MORGAN, RULES OF EVIDENCE-SUBSTAN-
TIVE OR PROCEDURAL,10 VAND. L. REV. 467 (1957); WIGMORE, A CRITIQUE OF THE FEDERAL COURT RULES DRAFT, 22
A.B.A.J. 888 (1936).
'See Rule 302 of the Supreme Court-approved draft (state law of presumptions applied in, essentially, diversity
cases-drafters felt compelled here; see Advisory Committee Note). Cf. Rules 502, 803(8), (14); 804(b)(1), 901(b)(7);
902(1); 903; 1005.
W'See Appendix hereto.
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APPENDIX
Table of Federal Rules of Evidence Showing Proposed Amendments*
RULE
(SUPREME COURT-APPROVED DRAFT)
PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS OF
SUBCOMMITTEE
.. E . Substance of Change or Comment
Article I. General Provisions:
Rule
101. Scope
102. Purpose and construction
103. Rulings on evidence:
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling:
(1) Objection
(2) Offer of proof
(b) Record of offer and ruling
(c) Hearing ofjury
(d) Plain error
104. Preliminary questions:
(a) Questions of admissibility generally
(b) Relevancy conditioned on fact
(c) Hearing of jury
(d) Testimony by accused
(e) Weight and credibility
105. Summing up and comment by judge
106. Limited admissibility
107. Remainder of or related writings or
recorded statements
Article II. Judicial Notice:
Rule
201. Judicial notice of adjudicative facts:
(a) Scope of rule
(b) Kinds of facts
(c) When discretionary
(d) When mandatory
(e) Opportunity to be heard
(f) Time of taking notice
(g) Instructing jury
Article Ill. Presumptions:
Rule
301. Presumptions in general
302. Applicability of state law in civil cases
X Accused witness has right to be heard away from
jury on preliminary matters; formerly only "as
justice requires."
Power to comment left uncodified-exists any
way.'
No longer limited to only adjudicative facts.'
Noticed fact may be disputed.'
Criminal presumptions against prosecution elimi-
nated from FRE
X "Civil cases" changed to "civil actions."
*This Appendix charts the progress of the proposed amendments from June 28, 1973, when they First appeared,
through Nov. 15, 1973, the latest version of them as of the date of this article (Dec. 31, 1973). As of Dec. 31, 1973, no
Congressional action has been taken on them. The body of the chart shows the rule headings as the rules were adopted
by the Supreme Court, Nov. 20, 1972, 56 F.R.D. 183, but suspended pending Congressional review, by Act of Mar. 30,
1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9. The body of the chart then shows the substance of the changes in these rules, pro-
posed by Committee Print dated June 28, 1973, H.R. 5463, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, of the House .Judiciary
Committee. Changes in this, proposed by a later Committee Print (Oct. 10, 1973), same subcommittee, same H.R. num-
ber, are shown in the numbered footnotes to this Appendix. Finally, the lettered footnotes show changes in all this
appearing in Bill H.R. 5463 as reported out of Committee, Nov. 15, 1973, with its accompanying report, House Rep.
No. 93-650, 93d Cong. lst Sess., Nov. 15, 1973. A footnote bearing both a number and a letter (e.g., "ll") near a provi-
sion of the chart means two footnotes are attached: a numbered footnote and a lettered footnote, connoting, therefore,
that the provision has been addressed or changed twice since the body of the chart.
aNew comment questions desirability of current law; suggests future re-examination.
'Reinstated as in Supreme Court-draft. On the need for this revision, see Rothstein, THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO
THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, 62 GEO. L..J. 125 at 162 (1973) [hereinafter cited as "GEO."j.2Reinstated in altered form to give lesser effect in criminal cases. On the need for this, see GEO. at 163.3Further altered to give civil presumptions lesser effect than shifting persuasion burden.
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303. Presumptions in criminal cases
(against accused)
(a) Scope
(b) Submission tojury
(c) Instructing the jury
Article IV. Relevancy and its Limits:
Rule
401. Definition of "relevant evidence"
402. Relevant evidence generally admissible;
irrelevant evidence inadmissible
403- Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds
of prejudice, confusion, or waste of time
404. Character evidence not admissible to prove
conduct; exceptions; other crimes;
(a) Character evidence generally:
(I) Character of accused
(2) Character of victim
(3) Character of witness
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts
405. Methods of proving character:
(a) Reputation or opinion4
(b) Specific instances of conduct
406. Habit; routine practice:
(a) Admissibility
(b) Method of proof 5b
407. Subsequent remedial measures
408. Compromise and offers to compromise6
409. Payment of medical and similar expenses
410. Offer to plead guilty; nolo contendere;
withdrawn plea of guilty
7
411. Liability insurance
Article V. Privileges:
Rule
501. Privileges recognized only as provided
502. Required reports privileged by statute
503. Lawyer-client privilege:
(a) Definitions
(b) General rule of privilege
(c) Who may claim the privilege
(d) Exceptions:
(1) Furtherance of crime or fraud
(2) Claimants through same de-
ceased client
(3) Breach of duty by lawyer
or client
(4) Document attested by lawyer
(5) Joint clients
504. Psychotherapist-patient privilege:
(a) Definitions
(b) General rule of privilege
(c) Who may claim the privilege
(d) Exceptions:
(I) Proceedings for hospitalization
(2) Examination by order of judge
(3) Condition an element of claim
or defense
,E 2 1:uuE
N ~
Eliminated from FRE.
X Except as otherwise provided by rules of Supreme
Court ("pursuant to statute" added).
X Mere clarification.
X Be sure to construe narrowly.
X Merely acknowledges seeing comments of others.
State law in diversity cases; common law (modi-
fied) in all others.'
Omitted.
Omitted.
Omitted.
+Allowance of opinion evidence deleted.
'Deleted.
bNew comment states that deletion of (b) not meant as "general authorization of opinion evidence in this area."
6Altered as to statements of fact in compromise negotiations-effect uncertain.7Exception for other acts of Congress added.
8Word "element" added-now conforms more precisely to presumptions language-little substantive effect intended.
["Diversity eases" is a generalization in this chart. Consult text of amendment.]
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505. Husband-wife privilege:
(a) General rule of privilege
(b) Who may claim the privilege
(c) Exceptions
506. Communications to clergymen:
(a) Definitions
(b) General rule of privilege
(c) Who may claim the privilege
507. Political vote
508. Trade secrets
50 9 . Secrets of state and other official
information:
(a) Definitions:
(I) Secrets of state
(2) Official information
(b) General rule of privilege
(c) Procedure
(d) Notice to government
(e) Effect of sustaining claim
510. Identity of informer:
(a) Rule of privilege
(b) Who may claim
(c) Exceptions:
(1) Voluntary disclosure; informer
a witness
(2) Testimony on merits
(3) Legality of obtaining evidence
51I. Waiver of privilege by
voluntary disclosure
512. Privileged matter disclosed under compul-
sion or without opportunity to claim
privilege
513. Comment upon or inference from claim of
privilege; instruction:
(a) Comment or inference not permitted
(b) Claiming privilege without knowledge
of jury
(c) Jury instruction
Article VI. Witnesses:
Rule
601. General rule of competency
602. Lack of personal knowledge
603. Oath or affirmation
604. Interpreters
605. Competency of judge as witness
606. Competency of juror as witness:
(a) At the trial
(b) Inquiry into validity of verdict
or indictment
607. Who may impeach
608 Evidence of character and conduct
of witness:
(a) Opinion and reputation evidence
of characterO
(a) Specific instances of conduct
609. Impeachment by evidence of conviction
of crime:
(a) General rule
THEMES
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X
X
X
X
X
X
N
X
N
X
Omitted.
Omitted.
Omitted.
Omitted.
Omitted.
Omitted.
Omitted.
Omitted.
Omitted.
State law governs in diversity cases.'
Broadened exceptions to incomptency.
X Nere clarification.
Ad hoc power in some degree reinstated. It
'Same addition as in footnote 8, supra, Appendix. [See also brackets, footnote 8 supra, Appendix.)
'°Allowance of opinion deleted.
--Clarified so ad hoe judicial veto power does not apply to crimen falsi (i.e., to crimes of dishonesty and false state-
ment). On the earlier confusion, see GEO. at 144 n. 101.
cAdmissibility limited to crimes of dishonesty and false statement (i.e., to "crimen falsi'); ad ho- judicial veto power
removed. For criticism of broader crimes of earlier versions, see GEO. at 143-45.
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(h) Time limit
(c) Effect of pardon, annulment, or
certificate of rehabilitation" 3
(d) Juvenile adjudications
(e) Pendency of appeal
610. Religious beliefs or opinions
611. Mode and order of interrogation and
presentation:
(a) Control by judge
(b) Scope of cross-examination
(c) Leading questions
612. Writing used to refresh memory
613. Prior statements of witnesses:
(a) Examining witness concerning
prior statement
(b) Extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent
statement by witness
614. Calling and interrogation of witnesses
by judge:
(a) Calling by judge
(b) Interrogation by judge
(c) Objections
615. Exclusion of witnesses
Article VII Opinions and Expert Testimony:
Rule
701. Opinion testimony by lay witnesses
702. Testimony by experts
703. Bases of opinion testimony by experts
704. Opinion on ultimate issue
705. Disclosure of facts or data underlying
expert opinion
706. Court appointed experts:
(a) Appointment
(b) Compensation
(c) Disclosure of appointment
(d) Parties' experts of own selection
Article VIII. Hearsay:
Rule
801. Definitions:
(a) Statement
(b) Declarant
(c) Hearsay
(d) Statements which are not hearsay:
(I) Prior statement by witness
(2) Admission by party-opponent
802. Hearsay rule
803. Hearsay exceptions; availability of
declarant immaterial:
(1) Present sense impression
(2) Excited utterance
tO E'
X Old crimes can't be revived by more recent ones.i12
Only usable in criminal cases (still in judge's
discretion).
Cross limited to matters opened on direct.
X "Civil cases" to "civil actions"; also mere
clarification.4d
Opponent's right to see and use documents not
used on the stand cut down-made discretionary.
Also, clarifying word change.
Prior inconsistent statements may be used sub-
stantively only if made at earlier hearing or grand
jury- f
X Same wording change as in Rule 402.
12Clarified.
isClarified; requirements altered somewhat.
irRight to call adverse party or associated witness left to existing law.
dAdds "hostile" witness to category of leadable witnesses. Clarifies applicability to criminal cases.
eAdds comment that privilege is still applicable
fGrand jury eliminated. Requirement added that prior hearing must provide opportunity to cross examine. See
criticism of earlier position in GEO. at n. 117.
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(3) Then existing mental, emotional,
or physical condition'
(4) Statements for purposes of medical
diagnosis or treatment
(5) Recorded recollection
(6) Records of Regularly conducted
activity
(7) Absence of entry in records of regularly
conducted activity
(8) Public records and reports
(9) Records of vital statistics.
(10) Absence of public record or entry
(11) Records of religious organizations
(12) Marriage, baptismal, and similar
certificates
(13) Family records
(14) Records of documents affecting an
interest in property
(15) Statements in documents affecting an
interest in property
(16) Statements in ancient documents
(17) Market reports, commercial
publications
(18) Learned treatises
(19) Reputation concerning personal or
family history
(20) Reputation concerning boundaries or
general history
(21) Reputation as to character
(22) Judgment of previous conviction
(23) Judgment as to personal, family, or
general history, or boundaries
(24) Other exceptions
804. Hearsay exceptions: declarant unavailable:
(a) Definition of unavailability
(b) Hearsay exceptions:
(1) Former testimony
(2) Statement of recent perception
(3) Statement under belief of
impending death
(4) Statement against interest
(5) Statement of personal or family
history
(6) Other exceptions
THEMES
E
x
xX
Confined to "businesses" and "professions";
elements reworded. t5
Same as Rule 803(6).16
X "Civil cases" to "civil actions." Also
comment: construe "factual findings"
narrowly.
X Grammatical.
Omitted.
Duty to take deposition. 17
Requires party or representative to be at former
proceeding.18
Omitted.
Applies in civil cases and criminal homicide
cases only.
Expansion of qualifying interests cut back; use
against accused of co-conspirator's statement
forbidden; 9 3d party confession used by
accused needs higher corroboration.
Omitted.
gNew comment added to the effect that the state of mind exception cannot be used to show intention of person other
than declarant or to show that such intention of such other person was probably carried out. Need for this clarification is
discussed in Rothstein, Understanding the Federal Rules of Evidence 118 (1973).
tsBusiness and profession broadened to include occupation and calling of every kind. On the need for this, see cEO. at
150.
6Corresponding change to rule 803(6) above.
17Duty to depose eliminated as to former testimony exception. On the need for this, see GEO. at 148.
IsRequirement of similar motive added. On the need for this, see GEO. at 151.
hlone 28 & Oct. 10 comment modified to permit court to recognize that interests other than pecuniary, proprietary,
or penal, may have derivative adverse effects on pecuniary, proprietary, or penal interests. On the need for this modifica-
tion, see CEO. at 154-55-
t"Clarified to state that exclusion of co-conspirator statement is merely exclusion from this hearsay exception. On the
need for this, see GEO. at n. 150.
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805. Hearsay within hearsay X
806. Attacking and supporting credibility
of declarant X
Article IX. Authentication and Identification:
Rule
901. Requirement of authentication or
identification:
(a) General provision X
(b) Illustrations:
(1) Testimony of witness with knowledge X
(2) Nonexpert opinion on handwriting X
(3) Comparison by trier or expert witness X
(4) Distinctive characteristics and the like X
(5) Voice identification X
(6) Telephone conversations X
(7) Public records or reports X
(8) Ancient documents or data compilations X
(9) Process or system X
(10) Methods provided by statute or rule
902. Self-authentication:
(1) Domestic public documents under seal X
(2) Domestic public documents not
under seal X
(3) Foreign public documents X
(4) Certified copies of public records
(5) Official publications X
(6) Newspapers and periodicals X
(7) Trade inscriptions and the like X
(8) Acknowledged documents
(9) Commercial paper and related
documents
(10) Presumptions under Acts of Congress
903. Subscribing witness' testimony unnecessary X
Article X. Contents of Writing, Recordings,
and Photographs:
Rule
1001. Definitions:
(1) Writings and recordings X
(2) Photographs
(3) Original X
(4) Duplicate X
1002. Requirement of original X
1003. Admissibility of duplicates
(1) Originals lost or destroyed
(2) Original not obtainable
(3) Original in possession of opponent
(4) Collateral matters
1005. Public records
1006. Summaries
1007. Testimony or written admission of party
1008. Functions of judge and jury
Article XL. Miscellaneous Rules:
Rule
1101. Applicability of rules:
(a) Courts and magistrates20
(b) Proceedings generally
(c) Rules of privilege
C2
E
X Wording change similar to Rule 402.
X Wording change similar to Rule 402.
X "Under hand and seal" changed to "as provided
by law."
X "General commercial law" means U.C.C. and
state law.
X Wording change similar to Rule 402.
X To encompass videotape.
" Hopefully judge will be easy to convince there is
genuine dispute on authenticity, which would
mean duplicate not treated like original.
" Loss or destruction at direction of proponent
hopefully treated like proponent's act.
X "Rules" changed to "rule"-to conform to
changes in Article V.
20Rules extended to court of claims.
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(d) Rules inapplicable:
(1) Preliminary questions of fact
(2) Grand jury
(3) Miscellaneous proceedings
(e) Rules applicable in part
1102. Title
THEMES
00R -.2 E0 'E Substance of Change or Comment
X Method of citations changed.
[Appendix continued on next page]
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APPENDIX CONTINUED
Additional Matters
A. In addition to the matters noted in the preceding chart, a few less
significant matters appearing in the Nov. 15, 1973 bill and its accompanying
report should be noted:
Rule 104 (c) (preliminary questions, hearing of jury). Comment notes that civil
cases are comprehended by the rule except where specifically noted otherwise.
Rule 106 (limited admissibility). Comment disclaims intent to affect law of
severance.
Rule 103 (4) (statements to medical persons). Comment states that particular
consideration has been given to the effect of rule as respects physical examination to
prepare physician to testify, and disclaims intent to adversely affect privilege.
Rule 803 (5) (past recollection recorded). Slight rule text change:writing may be
made "or adopted" by witness.
Rule 804 (a) (3) (lack of memory as unavailability). New comment: judge may of
course choose to disbelieve witness as to his lack of memory.
B. In addition, the Nov. 15 bill and report recognize for the first time
the potential overlap and conflict between 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1732 (a) (Federal
Business Records Act) and Rule 803 (6) (Business Records). For a descrip-
tion of this problem, see Rothstein, Understanding the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, 121-22 (1973). The bill accordingly strikes out Sec. 1732(a); and simi-
larly amends Sec. 1733 to avoid overlap or conflict with Rule 803(8) (public
records and reports).
C. The bill also adopts the Supreme Court's conforming amendments
to the civil and criminal rules of procedure. It further provides that the Rules
of Evidence are amendable by means of the Supreme Court submitting
amendments to Congress, which amendments become effective 180 days after
such submission unless either House of Congress vetoes them (as compared
with the 90 days and joint action prescribed under existing law, left un-
touched, for the rules of procedure).
D. The Nov. 15 bill must be passed by both Houses of Congress. As of
the date of preparation of this article (Dec. 31, 1973), neither House has
acted, although the bill is expected to come before the House shortly at which
time possible floor amendments might include the following:
i. Change Rule 609 (convictions) back to an earlier version.
ii. Narrow Rule 803(8) (reports of public offices and agencies).
iii. Re-instate Rules 803 (24) and 804 (b) (6) (the "catch-all" exceptions to the
hearsay rule) in a modified compromise version with notice provisions.
iv. Grant Congress a broader role in the process of amending the rules after
adoption:require affirmative approval rather than a mere veto procedure.
E. Despite Congressional consideration of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, they continue to be cited, including citations in areas most intensely
under Congressional scrutiny.
See, e.g.,
Colvin v. United States, 479 F.2d 998 (9th Cir. 1973).
United States v. Soles, 482 F.2d 105 (2d Cir. 1973) (Judge Friendly).
In Re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1973) (Judge Friendly).
United States v. England, 480 F.2d 1266 (5th Cir. 1973).
United States v. Jones, 482 F.2d 747 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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Holiday Inns v. Holiday Out, 481 F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1973).
United States v. Luther, 481 F.2d 429 (9th Cir. 1973).
United States v. Karnap, 477 F.2d 390 (4th Cir. 1973).
Pope v. Travelers Ins. Co., 477 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1973).
United States v. Baum, 482 F.2d 1325 (2d Cir. 1973).
United States v. Coppola, 479 F.2d 1153 (10th Cir. 1973).
F. State efforts to imitate the Federal Rules of Evidence have begun.
See:
NEV. REV. STAT. tit. 4, ch. 47-52 (1971);
NEW MEXICO RULES OF EVIDENCE, 84 N.M. xi, xi-cxxxi (1973);
WISC. RULES OF EVIDENCE, WEST, 1973 WISC. LEGIS. SERV. 131;
PROPOSED NEB. RULES OF EVID., NEB. SUPREME COURT COM-
MITTEE ON PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, AUG. 1973.
G. United States Bankruptcy Court Rule 917 makes "The Federal
Rules of Evidence apply in bankruptcy cases, subject to specific provisions in
[its] rules governing matters of evidence." See Bankruptcy Rules and Forms,
476 F.2d 1, 90 (1973). Although Congress has not yet approved the Novem-
ber, 1972 Supreme Court approved draft of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
nevertheless it is apparently that draft that is applicable in bankruptcy pro-
ceedings. See infra, DIM, ARTICLE XI: MIS.CELLANEOUS RULES UNDER THE
PROPOSED FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE As APPLIED To BANKRUPTCY
COURTS, 33 FED. BARJ. 92 (1974).
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